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a  b  s  t  r  a  c t
A  European  Union  (EU)  wide  pesticide  tax scheme  is  among  the future  plans  of  EU  policy  makers.  This
study  examines  the  information  needs  for applying  an optimal  pesticide  policy  framework  at  the  EU
level.  Damage  control  speciﬁcation  studies,  empirical  results  from  pesticide  demand  elasticity,  issuesvailable online 22 October 2012
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on  pesticide  risk valuation  and  uncertainty,  and  knowledge  on the  indirect  effects  of  pesticides  in rela-
tion to current  pesticide  policies  are  analysed.  Knowledge  gaps  based  on  reviewing  this  information  are
identiﬁed  and  an illustration  is provided  of the  direction  future  pesticide  policies  should  take.
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. Introduction
The past decades have witnessed a considerable increase in the
lobal production of agricultural goods and services. Plant protec-
ion products have played a major role in driving this growth, as
ave other technological innovations. However, the excessive use
f inputs like plant protection products has a concomitant impact
n the environment.
Plant protection products are active substances that enable
armers to control different pests including weeds, and thus con-
titute one of the most important inputs in agricultural production
With weeds being the major yield-reducing factor for many crops,
herbicides are the most widely used type of pesticides. Cooper and
Dobson [2] refer to a number of beneﬁts from pesticide use, among
which are (1) the improved shelf life of produce, (2) the reduced
drudgery of weeding, which frees labour for other tasks, (3) reduced
fuel use for weeding, (4) invasive species control, (5) increased
livestock yields and quality, and (6) garden plant protection.
The publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring [3], which high-
lighted the risks of pesticide use, stimulated the steady progress
in documenting the negative spillovers arising from the continu-1]. There is a large range of positive outcomes from the use of dif-
erent pesticides related to improving crop yields and the quality
f production resulting in increased farm and agribusiness proﬁts.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +317 485194.
E-mail address: alfons.oudelansink@wur.nl (A.G.J.M. Oude Lansink).
573-5214/$ – see front matter ©  2012 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Scienc
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2012.09.001ous use of chemical inputs [4–8]. Pesticides are not restricted to
use in agriculture: they are used frequently for landscaping, main-
taining sporting ﬁelds, for road and railway side weed control,
and public building maintenance. These substances can be dan-
gerous for human health when the degree of exposure exceeds
the safety levels. Exposure can be direct, for example when farm
workers apply pesticides to various crops, and indirect when con-
sumers ingest agricultural products that contain traces of the
es. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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For instance, command-and-control regulations may  be among
the means to reach a policy goal. Unlike market-based instru-
ments that encourage ﬁrms’ behaviour through market signals,6 T. Skevas et al. / NJAS - Wageningen Jo
hemical, or even when bystanders happen to be nearby application
reas.
Additionally, the excessive and uncontrolled use of pesticides
an pose serious and irreversible environmental risks and costs.
he decline in the number of beneﬁcial pest predators has led to
he proliferation of various pests and diseases with adverse impacts
n fauna and ﬂora [5]. Certain pesticides applied to crops eventu-
lly end up in ground and surface water. Sharpley et al. [6] note that
esticides play an important role in the pollution of surface water.
esticides have toxic effects on humans, livestock and wildlife [7]
hile among the risks they pose are pesticide residues in food,
ater, and soil, harm to agro-ecosystems, adverse effects on target
iota, and pest resistance [8]. Pesticide-resistant weeds and pests
an trigger increased pesticide applications to reduce the damage,
esulting in higher economic costs that farmers must shoulder.
The individual EU member countries and the European Commis-
ion (EC) have a long history of controlling pesticide use through
 myriad of country-speciﬁc programmes. Pesticide policies were
rst introduced at EU level in 1979. The directives 91/414/EC and
8/8/EC on the placing of plant protection products and biocidal
roducts on the market were the ﬁrst ones dealing with the autho-
ization of pesticides. The waste framework directive (2006/12/EC)
nd the directive on hazardous waste (91/689/EEC) constitute
egulations impacting pesticide use in many ways, as they estab-
ish provisions for the safe collection/disposal of empty pesticide
ackages and unused or expired pesticides. The water framework
irective (2000/609/EC) and the regulation on MRLs (396/2005)
ddress pesticide residuals, where the ﬁrst identiﬁes substances
hat are hazardous for water (including active substances in plant
rotection products) and the second sets maximum residue levels
f active substances in food and feed. The Thematic Strategy on the
ustainable Use of Pesticides completes the overview of the existing
esticide regulations, as it aims to regulate pesticide use. Regulation
o. 1107/2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products
n the market and directive No. 2009/128/EC on the sustainable
se of pesticides are due to replace directive 91/414/EC. Among the
uture goals are the establishment of quantitative reduction targets
nd the introduction of tax schemes.
Many EU member states show an increase in the sales of pes-
icides over the period 2002–2008 (e.g., the Netherlands 33%,
ermany 17% and Denmark 39%) [9]. The increase in pesticide use
nd the continuous presence of pesticides in aquatic environments
n conjunction with the fact that the current pesticide regulatory
ramework does not sufﬁciently address the actual use-phase of
esticides has led the EU to consider an overhaul of the pesti-
ide regulations [10]. The upgrade of existing pesticide regulations
ncludes the introduction of an EU-wide regulatory framework on
esticides, grounded upon economic incentives. The foundation of
uture EU policy schemes aims at the sustainable use of pesticides
n European agriculture. This effort involves reducing the risks and
mpacts of pesticide use on human health and the environment,
hile still being consistent with crop protection. The design of
ptimal pesticide policies requires insight into the relationships
etween production decisions on crop yields and their quality,
he environmental and health spillover impacts of pesticide use,
nd how policies and regulations inﬂuence production decision-
aking. A key policy consideration is balancing the incentives for
conomic growth against the adverse impact on the environment,
hich is broadly deﬁned to include the management of land, water
nd air, as well as the overall stability and biodiversity of the eco-
ogical system.
The objective of this paper is to explore the potential for
ntroducing an optimal pesticide policy at EU level from an eco-
omic point of view. The paper contributes to the literature by
eviewing the information needed for the introduction of such
 policy framework and by identifying knowledge gaps to be of Life Sciences 64– 65 (2013) 95– 103
addressed in support of an optimal pesticide policy design. The
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
presents an optimal pesticide policy framework. This is followed
by a review of the existing literature on pesticides that indicate the
extent to which the current literature provides information needed
for the implementation of optimal pesticide policies. The ﬁnal sec-
tion discusses knowledge gaps based on the literature review.
2. An optimal pesticide policy framework
Under the Pigouvian tradition, the optimal pesticide policy
grounded on economic incentives should include taxes (or subsi-
dies) to control pesticide externalities, where the tax (or subsidy)
reﬂects the marginal net damage (beneﬁt) of pesticide use. The
problem with such a policy framework is that obtaining an accurate
estimate of the monetary value of pesticide damage (or bene-
ﬁt) is not an easy task, mainly because of prohibitive information
requirements. Alternatively, Baumol and Oates [11] proposed the
establishment of a set of standards or targets for environmental
quality followed by the design of a regulatory system that could
employ taxes (or subsidies) to attain these standards. The authors
add that although this will not result in an optimal allocation of
resources (such as pesticides) it represents the most cost effec-
tive way  in attaining the speciﬁed standards. A pesticide policy
framework that combines market-based instruments with stan-
dards for acceptable environmental and health quality will enable
policy makers to base the charge rates or prices on the acceptabil-
ity standards rather than on the unknown value of marginal net
damages [12–14].
The design and application of a pesticide policy framework
grounded on market-based instruments and environmental and/or
health standards, requires rigorous information on different
dimensions and aspects of pesticide use. The elements needed
by policy makers to apply such a policy framework may  be
summarized by information on (1) the production structure (i.e.,
production function, pesticide demand elasticities), (2) attitudes
towards risk and uncertainty related to pesticides application, (3)
the value of pesticides to consumers (e.g., the willingness to pay
(WTP) for lower pesticide use), and (4) the indirect effects of pesti-
cide use. Information on the production structure of pesticide use
includes trends in pesticide use (overuse or underuse), and the
direction and extent farmers’ behaviour will change following the
introduction of a pesticide tax. In particular, will a pesticide price
increase lead to signiﬁcantly decreased pesticide use? Information
on the riskiness of pesticides in relation to output realization may
enhance the effectiveness of pesticide policy tools while evidence
on the consumers’ WTP  for reducing pesticide-adverse effects can
reveal if there is a demand for more environmental friendly prod-
ucts. So policy makers may  use this information by providing an
incentive to farmers to switch to more environmental friendly
forms of production (e.g., organic or Integrated Pest Management1
(IPM)). Finally, detailed data on the indirect effects of pesticides can
assist policy makers in setting proper environmental and health
standards that can increase the effectiveness of the different eco-
nomic instruments.
It is important to note that optimal pesticide use may  be
attained not only through the use of market-based instruments,
such as taxes and subsidies, but also of alternative instruments.1 The Food and Agriculture Organisation [94] deﬁnes IPM as “an ecosystem
approach to crop production and protection that combines different management
strategies and practices to grow healthy crops and minimize the use of pesticides.”
T. Skevas et al. / NJAS - Wageningen Journal 
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Fig. 1. Cost-beneﬁt analysis of a regulation.
ommand-and-control regulations set uniform standards for ﬁrms.
n example of a command-and-control measure in relation to pes-
icide policy is a ban on the use of speciﬁc pesticides. Stavins [15]
rgues that despite the proven success of market-based instru-
ents in reducing environmental pollution at a low cost, they
id not come close to replacing command-and-control measures.
iven that market-based instruments have a limited impact on
armers’ behaviour in the short term, command-and-control meas-
res (e.g., bans on pesticides) can more likely provide the desired
eductions in pesticide use to policy makers in the short term. As
esearch on pesticide externalities advances, pesticide bans may
lways have a place in pesticide policy frameworks.2 Baumol and
ates [11] add that a mixed system of regulations, composed of
oth ﬁscal and non-ﬁscal measures, constitutes an optimal regula-
ory strategy to reduce ﬁrms’ externalities. A complement to public
r market intervention instrument can be agricultural production
n certiﬁed farms (organic or IPM) or self-regulation. Farmers can
orm groups with common production rules (e.g., IPM), facing the
pportunity to gain from their collective capacity to establish a
eputation for their products. In this way farmers can experience
igher revenues and society can beneﬁt from reduced pesticide
xternalities. The formation of producer organizations can be pro-
oted by governments through providing ﬁnancial facilities (e.g.,
ower ﬁrm taxation).
An essential part of the design of an optimal pesticide pol-
cy is a rigorous comparison of the environmental beneﬁts with
he abatement costs for pesticide users and the administrative
osts of implementing the policy [16]. For instance, environmen-
al beneﬁts could be quantiﬁed in terms of species richness [17]
r quality of nearby surface water bodies and aquifers. Abatement
osts are an important component of farmers’ expenses and an
ssessment of the impacts of the potential policies in terms of the
conomic viability of adoption of different abatement strategies
e.g., purchasing more environmental friendly pesticides, mechan-
cal weeding) is essential. Administrative costs of implementing a
olicy could include costs of monitoring and keeping accounts of
armers’ abatement strategies, collecting tax revenues in case of
n economic incentive-based policy and developing and updating
 hazard ranking system for pesticides. As governments’ capac-
ty to spend on regulation may  be limited, cost-beneﬁt analysis
ould be a valuable guide for assessing the economic viability and
ffectiveness of different pesticide policy frameworks. Cost-beneﬁt
nalysis can also help identify the optimal intensity of regula-
ion needed as shown by Fig. 1, where MC  reﬂects the marginal
osts and MB  the marginal beneﬁts of pesticide regulation. At the
2 Many active ingredients have been recently banned, based on their adverse
ffect on human health.of Life Sciences 64– 65 (2013) 95– 103 97
intersection point P, the incremental beneﬁts from additional reg-
ulation are just offset by the incremental costs (e.g., additional
abatement costs and administrative costs). Concerns about envi-
ronmental beneﬁts revolve whether we  are above or below the
intersection point P and whether the beneﬁts from environmental
improvement will exceed the costs of attaining this improvement.
Balancing regulatory costs and beneﬁts is complicated by uncer-
tainties and stochastic events related to pesticide use and their
spillovers, such as extreme climatic conditions (e.g., high precipita-
tion levels can increase pesticide leaching) and occurrence of new
pest infestations (that can trigger higher pesticide applications and
increase environmental spillovers).
3. Production structure
Determining the impacts of a pesticide policy and the design
of an optimal pesticide policy requires information on the role of
pesticides in the production process and the relation between pes-
ticide use and pesticide prices. Section 3.1 discusses the available
literature on estimating the production function in the presence
of pesticides, whereas Section 3.2 presents empirical studies on
pesticide price elasticities.
3.1. Production function
In economics, a production function is a relation expressing
the amount of output attained by a ﬁrm for all combinations of
inputs [18]. Traditional speciﬁcations of the production function in
agricultural production are characterized by the symmetric treat-
ment of the inputs involved in the production process. Damage
abatement speciﬁcations treat inputs asymmetrically, i.e., inputs
are separated into those that increase output (productive inputs)
and those that reduce damage (damage abatement inputs) [19].
The concept of a damage abatement input was introduced by Hall
and Norgaard [20] and Talpaz and Borosh [21] and suggests that
pesticides have an indirect effect on output in future years caused
by pesticide resistance rather than a direct yield-increasing effect.
Lichtenberg and Zilberman [22] were the ﬁrst to specify produc-
tion functions that are consistent with the concept of damage
abatement input. Apart from pesticides, damage control inputs
could include windbreaks, buffer zones and antibiotics. The Licht-
enberg and Zilberman (LZ) [22] damage control framework enables
economists to observe that the Cobb-Douglas formulations used
in this study resulted in an upward bias in the optimal pesti-
cide use estimations, whereas recent evidence suggests an overuse
[23,24]. The LZ damage control speciﬁcation was applied by Oude
Lansink and Carpentier [19], Babcock et al. [23], Guan et al. [24],
Carrasco-Tauber and Mofﬁt [25], Chambers and Lichtenberg [26],
Oude Lansink and Silva [27], and Lin et al. [28]. Table 1 reviews
these studies using a set of the following common criteria: (1) set-
ting, (2) modelling framework, (3) data and application, and (4)
results and policy implications. The results are mixed with some
studies that indicate the overuse of pesticides, and other ones that
indicate underuse.
Although the LZ speciﬁcation constitutes a useful and widely
acceptable tool in the economics of pesticide use, the various
critiques [19,27] and mixed results developed by some authors
perpetuate the debate regarding this speciﬁcation. The majority
of ﬁndings show that pesticides are underused, which is con-
trary to the conventional view. Some interesting insights emerge
from studies implementing the LZ speciﬁcation predicting the
overuse of pesticides. The choice of speciﬁcation for the damage
abatement function signiﬁcantly impacts pesticide productivity
estimates. Studies permitting speciﬁcations allowing a decreasing
marginal product of pesticides are more likely to predict pesticide
98 T. Skevas et al. / NJAS - Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences 64– 65 (2013) 95– 103
Table 1
Studies that have successfully applied the LZ speciﬁcation.
Study Modelling framework Data/Application Trend in pesticide use
Oude Lansink and Carpentier [19] Generalized Maximum Entropy estimation Secondary; Arable farms, The
Netherlands
Underused
Babcock et al. [23] Damage control dynamic model Secondary; Apple production;
North Carolina, USA
Overused
Carrasco-Tauber and Mofﬁt [25] Damage control dynamic model Secondary; USA agriculture Underused
Oude  Lansink and Silva [27] Data envelopment analysis Secondary; Arable farms, The
Netherlands.
Underused
Chambers and Lichtenberg [26] Dual representation of generalized LZ model Secondary; USA. Agriculture Underused
Guan  et al. [24] Damage control model Secondary; Potato Overused
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Weibul damage-control speciﬁcation
veruse. Furthermore, the examined product/crop can inﬂuence
he ﬁnal result regarding the overuse or underuse of pesticides.
abcock et al. [23] applied the LZ speciﬁcation to apple produc-
ion data in North Carolina and found that pesticides are overused.
owever, apple production requires a considerable number of
reventive pesticide applications in order to obtain high qual-
ty output. Therefore, this preventive application can justify the
veruse of pesticides.
.2. Pesticide demand elasticity
The pesticide demand elasticity is a parameter that shows the
esponsiveness of the pesticide quantity demanded by a change in
he pesticide price. The design of regulatory frameworks for levies
n pesticides requires estimates of pesticide demand elasticities.
able 2 presents a review of the pesticide demand elasticity esti-
ates of European countries and the USA. A general conclusion
ased on this table is that the price elasticity of pesticide demand
s low (in most cases), indicating that pesticide use is indifferent
o pesticide price increases. Inelastic demand can indicate a lack of
nowledge among farmers regarding alternative production prac-
ices, a strong intention towards risk aversion, or can be due to
ehavioural factors like professional pride derived from weed-free
elds. Inelastic pesticide demand is also reported by Hoevenagel
t al. [13] in their study of an EU wide scheme for levies on
esticides. Therefore, a tax on pesticides is expected to create con-
iderable revenues but will have a small contribution to reducing
esticide externalities. Another important conclusion from Table 2
s that a lower elasticity of pesticide demand is found in studies
hat maintain a lower level of aggregation of the pesticide input
e.g., modelling speciﬁc pesticides such as herbicides and fungicides
eparately, versus aggregating over all types of pesticides). This sug-
ests that there are few substitutes for these speciﬁc products, with
he result that the producers face difﬁculties in adjusting their agri-
ultural practices. The difﬁculty of ﬁnding lower-risk alternatives
r applying alternative crop protection practices is also mentioned
y Wilson and Tisdel [29].
. Risk and uncertainty for the pesticides user and
egulator in relation to pesticide use
Both the regulator and the pesticide user face risks and different
ources of uncertainties that affect the social optimum. Produc-
ion uncertainty related to variability in climatic conditions can
ffect farmers’ pesticide use decisions. For instance, high levels of
recipitation can increase weed growth, leading to increased her-
icide applications. Skevas et al. [30] show that ignoring the effects
f variability in production conditions when measuring farmers’
erformance may  lead to an overestimation of farmers’ pesticide
nvironmental inefﬁciency. The pesticide user also faces uncer-
ainty about pest arrival that can lead to the overuse of pesticidesproduction, The Netherlands
Secondary; Potato production,
Paciﬁc Northwest, USA
Trend depends on
model selection
relative to the private or social optimum. Norgaard [31] notes
that the major motivation for pesticide application is the provi-
sion of some “insurance” against damage. Feder [32] shows that
an increase in the degree of uncertainty due to pest damage will
cause an increase in the amount of pesticide used. As uncertainty in
the pest–pesticide system leads to a higher and more frequent use
of pesticides, there is also uncertainty regarding the effectiveness
of pesticides. Farmers lack full knowledge of the relation between
pesticides and pest mortality [32] and the effectiveness of pesti-
cides can be inﬂuenced by ﬂuctuations in temperature, wind and air
humidity conditions. So the pest population can vary with changes
in climatic conditions, though these changes can also alter the effect
of pesticides, as every chemical product has different durability.
The Just and Pope [33] approach to modelling production pro-
cesses in the face of production risk has been a popular addition to
the literature, and is widely used in applied analyses related to pes-
ticide use. In the Just and Pope model, the variation in production
is inﬂuenced by the input levels: some inputs may  be variation-
increasing, whereas other inputs are variation-decreasing, where
risk is deﬁned as the variance of output. Saha et al. [34] and Grif-
ﬁths and Anderson [35] also support the conventional view that
pesticides are risk-reducing inputs.
On the other hand, Horowitz and Lichtenberg [36] show
that limited knowledge of the production process, captured by
assuming that pest damage is independent of other factors affect-
ing output, leads to the conventional view that pesticides are
risk-reducing inputs. Pesticides may  increase risk when pest popu-
lations are positively correlated with growth conditions. When pest
populations are large and growth conditions are favourable, pes-
ticides will be risk-increasing as they increase the variability of
harvests (increase output under good growth conditions). Gotsch
and Regev’s [37] study of Swiss wheat producers shows that fungi-
cides have a risk-increasing effect on farm revenues when rain
levels are low. Similar results are reported by Saha et al. [38] when
the production process takes into account the interaction between
pesticides and fertilizers, and by Pannell [39] where herbicides have
a risk-increasing effect on wheat farmers in Kansas. Horowitz and
Lichtenberg [40] have shown that pesticides may  be risk-increasing
inputs and farmers who  purchase federal government crop insur-
ance use more chemicals ceteris paribus. This view on pesticides is
contradicted by Smith and Goodwin [41].
Saha et al. [38] report the importance of considering the stochas-
tic nature of both the damage control and the production function
to avoid overestimating the marginal productivity of damage con-
trol inputs. With pesticide productivity affected by the level of
the developed resistance, the more resistant the pest population,
the higher the use of the damage control agents (pesticides) until
resistance is sufﬁciently pervasive and alternative damage control
measures are more cost effective.
Uncertainty of the regulator of pesticides arises from incom-
plete knowledge about the side effects of pesticides. Postponing
T. Skevas et al. / NJAS - Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences 64– 65 (2013) 95– 103 99
Table 2
Pesticide Demand Elasticity Estimates.
Study Country/region Elasticity
Aaltink [65] The Netherlands −0.13 to −0.39
Antle [66] USA −0.19
Bauer et al. [67] German regions −0.02
Brown and Christensen [68] USA −0.18
Carpentier [69] France −0.3
DHV and LUW [70] The Netherlands −0.2 to −0.3
Dubgaard [71] Denmark −0.3 (threshold approach)
Dubgaard [72] Denmark −0.7 (herbicides), −0.8 (fung. + insect.)
Ecotec  [73] UK −0.5 to −0.7 (herbicides)
Elhorst [74] The Netherlands −0.3
Falconer [62] UK (East Anglia) −0.1 to −0.3
Gren  [75] Sweden −0.4 (fung.), −0.5 (insect.), −0.9 (fung.)
Johnsson [76] Sweden −0.3 to −0.4 (pesticides)
Komen et al. [77] The Netherlands −0.14 to −0.25
Lichtenberg et al. [78] USA −0.33 to −0.66
McIntosh and Williams [79] Georgia (USA) −0.11
Oskam et al. [80] The Netherlands −0.1 to −0.5 (pesticides)
Oskam et al. [14] EU −0.2 to −0.5 (pesticides)
Oude  Lansink [81] The Netherlands −0.12
Oude Lansink and Peerlings [82] The Netherlands −0.48 (pesticides)
Papanagiotou [83] Greece −0.28
Petterson et al. [84] Sweden −0.2
Rude [85] Sweden −0.22 to −0.32
Russell et al. [86] UK (Northwest) −1.1 (pesticides in cereals)
SEPA  [87] Sweden −0.2 to −0.4
Schulte [88] Three German regions −0.23 to −0.65
Villezca and Shumway [89] Texas and Florida (USA) −0.16 to −0.21
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esticide regulation to wait for better scientiﬁc knowledge can lead
o irreversible environmental and health costs. The precautionary
rinciple, ﬁrst deﬁned in the 1992 Rio Declaration, addresses this
ssue by maintaining that uncertainty regarding the environmen-
al or health effects of pesticide use should not act as an obstacle
o the timely introduction of pesticide policies. The precautionary
rinciple is theoretically grounded in the theory of the quasi-option
alue and, in this context, implying that greater uncertainty about
he future impacts of an externality increases the costs of current
se of pesticides [42].
The following hypothetical example illustrates how the pre-
autionary principle applies to pesticide application in agriculture.
onsider the introduction of a tax scheme to internalize pesticide
xternalities in a two-time period setting. In the current period
here is uncertainty about the future state of the world. The nega-
ive external effects of pesticides have not been documented fully,
or have the costs of introduction been quantiﬁed precisely. How-
ver, introducing a pesticide tax in the current period can be more
ostly than waiting for better information, as the intensity of reg-
lation introduced may  be excessive. Acting in the future period
an be devastating in terms of biodiversity loss, as there are often
ifﬁculties with enhancing biodiversity levels after long periods of
ntensive agrochemical use [43], Therefore, uncertainty about the
eneﬁts, or avoiding negative external effects, may  induce the reg-
lator to introduce a greater intensity of regulation in the current
eriod.
Risk and uncertainty have implications not only for the time of
ntroduction and the intensity of regulation per se but also for the
hoice of policy instrument; i.e., taxation versus quantity control
hat may  involve bans or quota. Weitzman [44] ﬁnds that when
here is uncertainty about the marginal costs of supplying a good, a
rice instrument is more (less) efﬁcient than a quantity instrument
f the marginal beneﬁts of that good are relatively ﬂat (steep) com-
ared with the marginal costs. Hepburn [45] provides a graphical
epresentation of Weitzman’s ﬁnding by illustrating the choice of a
ax versus a quantity control relative to the marginal costs and ben-
ﬁts followed by practical examples. In the case of pesticides, let’shypothesize that the relevant good is the reduction of pesticide
environmental spillovers (i.e., providing a cleaner/safer environ-
ment). Suppose the marginal cost of reducing the environmental
spillovers of pesticides is uncertain and increases quickly due to
irreversibility involved in enhancing for example biodiversity lev-
els [43]. The marginal beneﬁt from a decrease in the environmental
spillovers of pesticides is relatively ﬂat (i.e., the environmental
damages from pesticide use may  still be high but do not change
rapidly as a function of additional pesticide applications). In this
case, a pesticide tax is the appropriate instrument to use. On the
other hand, if damages rise above a regulatory limit then the use of
a quantity-based instrument (e.g., a ban on pesticides) is encour-
aged.
5. Pesticide risk valuation
During the last two decades, many attempts have been made
to value pesticide risks. Economists have focused primarily on the
evaluation of health beneﬁts for farmers and consumers due to the
historically human-driven interest in pesticide risk management.
The food safety literature focuses primarily on the evaluation of
human health risks related to the presence of pesticide residues in
fresh food whereas the valuation literature focuses on consumers’
WTP  for residue-free products [46]. In recent years, WTP  stud-
ies have been extended to pesticide health risks for farmers [47],
whereas some studies estimate WTP  for both human health and
the environment (e.g., [48]). The meta-analyses of Florax et al. [46]
and Travisi et al. [49] provide an overview of the literature on
pesticide risk valuation. These analyses ﬁnd that the literature is
diverse, providing WTP  estimates largely for various human health
risks, with fewer studies addressing environmental risks. The stud-
ies addressing the negative externalities on human health ﬁnd great
variation in the WTP  estimates, with some studies ﬁnding higher
WTP  for human safety than for environmental quality [48], whereas
others present higher WTP  for environmental quality than for food
safety and human health [50]. This mixed evidence is attributed
to the use of different valuation techniques, and to differences
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mong the available biomedical and ecotoxicological data. Foster
nd Mourato [48] provide a conjoint analysis of pesticide risks by
stimating the marginal value of risk reduction for human health
nd bird biodiversity. Additionally, Schou et al. [51] and Travisi
nd Nijkamp [52] used a choice experiment approach to estimate
he economic value of reduced risks from pesticide use. The lat-
er approach was also used by Chalak et al. [53], who found high
TP  for reduced pesticide use for both environmental quality and
onsumer health. Moreover, their study indicates the presence of
eterogeneous preferences for pesticide reduction in relation to
nvironmental quality and food safety.
The review of WTP  studies has shown that consumers, in gen-
ral, are willing to pay for a reduction in human health and
nvironmental risks resulting from the application of pesticides.
his fact favours farmers’ switch to IPM or organic agriculture. In
his way, reductions in pesticide use could be attained with gains in
arm income through conversion to less pesticide-intensive crop-
ing systems. Advice, training and extension in reduced pesticide
se practices can encourage farmers’ conversion to less pesticide-
ntensive farming. Subsidizing production on certiﬁed farms (e.g.,
PM or organic) or promoting self-regulation for pesticide-free
roducts may  further stimulate farmers to alter their crop protec-
ion practices.
The many WTP  studies available enable the calculation of a mean
TP  for a lower exposure to different risks. As the income elasticity
f WTP  for risk reduction is not signiﬁcantly different from zero and
eographical differences in valuation are minor [46], WTP  estimates
rom other countries can be used in EU pesticide policy design to
ssist, in the case of an economic incentive-based policy, in deter-
ining the pesticide tax level and in quantifying the beneﬁts from
esticide risk reduction, more generally.
. Indirect effects of pesticides
Data on the indirect effects of pesticides can enable the devel-
pment of environmental and health standards, thus favouring the
ntroduction of regulatory schemes that will use economic incen-
ives to attain these standards. Research on pesticide spillovers on
uman health seems to be more advanced considering the ban-
ing of many active ingredients on human health grounds. Sexton
t al. [54] underline the need for and difﬁculty in incorporating
nd translating pesticide externalities into policy. They also con-
rm the low level of knowledge on the environmental effects of
esticides compared with human health effects. The use of envi-
onmental and health standards in pesticide policies in different EU
ountries are listed in Table 3. Only a few European countries (i.e.,
weden, Norway, France, and Belgium) use environmental and/or
ealth standards to base their pesticide policy tools on. Sweden was
ne of the ﬁrst countries to introduce a simple tax scheme based
n an environmental tax, whereas Norway uses a tax system where
he taxation level is banded by health and environmental proper-
ies. In France there are taxes on seven categories of pesticides as
on-point sources of pollution, which reﬂects the differing environ-
ental load of each plant protection product. Belgium has recently
ntroduced a pesticide tax on ﬁve active substances that is based
n health and environmental risk criteria [55]. According to OECD
55] the use of plant protection products in the abovementioned
ountries has declined, but it is difﬁcult to separate the impact of
axation on pesticide use from other factors inﬂuencing farmers’
se decisions. Moreover, in Norway, the high reductions in pesti-
ide risks should be treated with caution due to the stockpiling of
esticides prior to the expected increases in pesticide taxation [55].
The changes in environmental and health risks can be quantiﬁed
hrough a number of indices providing a measure of the hazard
nherent to a substance. The Environmental Impact Quotient (EIQ) of Life Sciences 64– 65 (2013) 95– 103
is such an index that calculates pesticides’ toxicity by taking into
account the potential hazard to ﬁeld workers, consumers and the
environment [56]. Cross and Edwards-Jones [57] use the EIQ and a
simple extension of it to assess changes in pesticide hazard in the
UK for arable farming between 1992 and 2008. Labite et al. [58]
review 19 pesticide hazard indices, stating that indices differ in
terms of methods used and functionality. In conclusion, the current
literature offers approaches to quantify pesticide spillovers with
the selection of the appropriate approach depending on the speciﬁc
requirements and available data [58].
7. Discussion
The review of the information needed for the introduction of an
optimal pesticide policy framework in the EU has revealed several
knowledge gaps, thus providing useful insights to policy makers.
The evidence from studies using the LZ speciﬁcation is mixed.
Overuse or underuse of pesticides may  depend on the speciﬁcation
itself but also on the application to different crops. More research
needs to be done across EU countries for different crops to obtain
a clear view of pesticide use trends. Overuse of pesticides implies
that policy efforts should focus on decreasing applied quantities
whereas underuse shows that the policy target should not be to
reduce the pesticide application volume but to stimulate substitu-
tion of hazardous products with low-toxicity alternatives.
Pesticide productivity varies amongst other things with changes
in climatic conditions, indicating that taxes on pesticides should
be country or region speciﬁc. A considerable number of pesticide
risk studies oppose the conventional view of pesticides being risk
reducing. If pesticides are risk increasing then a pesticide tax (lead-
ing to reduced pesticide use) will render agricultural production
less risky. Greater dissemination of such scientiﬁc ﬁndings may
increase the effectiveness of pesticide tax schemes. With pesti-
cide demand in general being inelastic, only large pesticide price
changes can alter farmers’ practices. Considering that high pesti-
cide tax rates may  be politically problematic, pesticide taxation
might not be considered an effective policy instrument. However,
taking into account producers’ heterogeneity, economic incentives
may  still play a role in pesticide policies by encouraging efﬁciency
improvements in pesticide applications or movement to less pes-
ticide intensive forms of cropping (e.g., IPM).
As pesticides are not homogeneous goods, pesticide taxation
needs classiﬁcation according to toxic contents [59]; i.e., higher
taxes to be imposed on pesticides that are more harmful to the
environment and human health. Hazard ranking approaches are
available but their use depends amongst other things on data avail-
ability [58]. Oskam et al. [14] strongly encourage the European
Commission to adopt a uniform or, if possible, a differentiated tax
within the EU. A uniform tax would be a second-best choice in cases
where there is lack of data on the external effects of pesticides, ren-
dering the pesticide differentiation process a difﬁcult task. In this
case a uniform tax can lead to increased tax revenues (due to inelas-
tic pesticide demand, as shown in Section 3.2) that can be used to
fund research on pesticide externalities and stimulate the devel-
opment of a system of pesticide hazard ranking that will enable
policy makers to develop differentiated taxes. Effective pesticide
policies should differentiate pesticides according to their health
and environmental externalities as current EU pesticide policy [1]
highlights the importance of reducing risks to both human health
and the environment.
More than a decade ago, Hoevenagel et al. [13] noted the difﬁcul-
ties in discriminating pesticides according to their environmental
externalities. Since then, no action has been taken by the EU in
stimulating an EU-wide or country speciﬁc data collection of pes-
ticide impacts. Labite et al. [58] conﬁrm the absence of a standard
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Table 3
Pesticide policies in different European countries.
Country Description of pesticide policy Values for pesticide taxes/fees/levies
Sweden Environmental tax per kg of active substance 30 SEK per kg active substance (ac) (D 3.25 per kg ac)
Norway  Banded tax system Basic tax: 20 NOK per ha (D 2.6 per ha), LT products: D 2.6
per ha, MT:  D 10.4 per ha, HT: D 20.8 per haa
Denmark - Differentiated pesticide tax
-  Overall tax on all pesticides.
Insecticides: 54% of retail price (rp),
Herbicides/fungicides/growth regulators: 34% of rp; wood
preservatives: 3% of gross value
Italy  Sales control, pesticide tax 0.5% and 1% over the ﬁnal price of domestic and imported
pesticides, respectively
UK  - Target fee for registration
- General fee for industry.
Target fee: D 5000, General fee: D 5719
Switzerland - Direct payments, Extra subsidies.
-  Minimum ecological standards.
Finland Registration charge D 840 + 3.5% of ﬁnal price (excluding VAT)
Netherlands Integrated crop protection on certiﬁed farms
France Pesticide tax Categorya 1: D per ton, 2: D 381 per ton, 3: D 610 per ton,
4: D 838 per ton, 5: D 1067 per ton, 6: D 1372 per ton, 7:
D  1677 per ton
Germany Pesticide reduction programme
Belgium Tax on ﬁve active substancesb D 0.395 per kg
Source: OECD [55]; Hoevenagel et al. [13]; PAN Europe [92]; Parkkinen [93].
a LT, MT and HT denote low medium and high toxicity products, respectively. Pesticides taxes also exist for seed treatment pesticides (D 1.3 per ha), concentrated hobby
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froducts  (D 130 per ha), and ready to use hobby products (D 390 per ha).
b Categories reﬂect the different environmental load of each plant protection pro
ealth  and environmental criteria.
ethodology for selecting input data for tools that rank pesticide
isks. Zilberman and Millock [60] argue that the construction of an
ffective pesticide tax scheme requires rigorous data collection on
esticide use at farm level. As pesticide application levels and their
xternalities are very diverse across different regions and under
ifferent climatic conditions [61], country-speciﬁc research is of
tmost importance. Pesticide classiﬁcation through the develop-
ent of environmental impact-based indicators for each country
r region would be important for improving the effectiveness of
esticide policies. The tax systems based on environmental stan-
ards and used in some countries encompass compelling lessons
or an EU-wide regulatory framework on ways to charge, collect,
ifferentiate and reimburse the tax. The limited use of the environ-
ental or health standards in national pesticide policies and the
mall reductions in pesticide use in the countries that use these
tandards may  be attributed to the multidimensionality and lack
f data on indirect effects of pesticides. This has made it impossible
or policy makers to introduce optimal economic incentive-based
olicies that will not only aim to ﬁnance national action plans but
ill also affect farmers’ behaviour.
Falconer [62] argues that an effective environmental banding
ould be based on groups of pesticides with similar hazard scores
nstead of developing environmental indicators (based on envi-
onmental impacts) for each pesticide. A starting point for such
 classiﬁcation could be the development of hazard scores for the
abelling of pesticides, including precautions for environmental and
uman health safety and its mandatory in all EU member states.
esticide clusters with higher hazard scores could be prioritized
or reductions.
The optimal regulatory strategy does not have to be composed
f single policy tools but can involve a mixture of measures and
ctions such as tax schemes, direct controls, farm certiﬁcation and
elf-regulation. In this way the different measures may  compen-
ate each one’s deﬁciencies. Taxes may  have little effect on total
esticide use, but may  help in creating awareness among farm-
rs; direct controls can be an effective tool for reducing pesticide
se, but often have little support among farmers; certiﬁcation and
elf-regulation are facing relatively high transaction and monitor-
ng costs, but are appealing tools for affecting farmer behaviour
n the long run. Skevas et al. [95] examined the impact of dif-
erent economic instruments on pesticide use and environmentalith 1 and 7 being the lowest and highest toxicity category, respectively. c Based on
spillovers in Dutch arable farming and concluded that a pesticide
policy composed of different instruments may  better address the
desired policy targets. Pesticide policies can be co-ordinated by the
EU with taxes or direct controls that are country or region speciﬁc,
as pesticide use and externalities vary regionally due to differ-
ences in agronomic characteristics [63]. Action taken at EU level
implies strong competitive effects between national regulatory sys-
tems [64]. Integrating economic incentives (deﬁned at EU level) in
existing national regulatory structures may  induce strong politi-
cal pressures on national policy makers to reform these structures.
Knill and Lenschow [64] state that the use of economic instruments
at EU level has been relatively weak compared with the national
level, pointing to the required member states’ unanimity needed
in tax-related decisions as a limiting factor. However, the authors
add that such problems may  be bypassed by enhanced co-operation
among groups of member states. Finally, a cost-beneﬁt analysis
assessing environmental beneﬁts, farmers’ abatement costs and
administrative costs of implementing a pesticide policy should be
an essential step in designing and evaluating an optimal regulatory
strategy.
8. Concluding remarks
In an era where existing EU pesticide policies are streamlined
and new policies are planned, this study sheds light on the opti-
mal  pesticide policy framework and examines the elements needed
for applying such a framework. An optimal pesticide policy should
include tax schemes that are based on standards for environmen-
tal and health quality but may  not rely necessarily on a speciﬁc
measure. As the introduction of market-based policy instruments
is among the future plans of EU policy makers, this study offers
some important insights. Inelastic pesticide demand suggests that
tax rates should be high while the development of health and envi-
ronmental standards, where differentiated tax rates can be based
on, needs further attention due to inadequate information on pes-
ticide externalities. Evidence from pesticide use trends (overuse or
underuse) among different crops and countries and its relation to
risk is mixed, implying that further investigation is needed possi-
bly at individual country level. The availability and robustness of
WTP  estimates concerning their income elasticity and geographi-
cal distribution enables policy makers to use WTP  estimates from
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ther countries in the design of pesticide regulations. The great
ariety of pesticide risks suggests that more primary research is
eeded. Pesticides affect human beings and other organisms differ-
ntly and have various environmental effects across countries due
o differences in climatic conditions and species richness. There-
ore pesticide policy tools like taxes need classiﬁcation according to
oxic contents. Approaches developing ranking systems of pesticide
azards do exist but their use depends on data availability. Country-
peciﬁc research on the effects of existing active ingredients on the
nvironment and a comparison of their effects on human health
ay  enable researchers to introduce differentiated ﬁscal measures,
nd trigger the chemical industry to develop effective alternatives.
s agrochemical innovation in general is complex, costly and time
onsuming, the development of economic incentive-based policies
rounded in the reality of agriculture can foster the innovation of
rop pest agents.
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